Time Is of the Essence: Limitation Periods in Real Property Disputes

Limitation periods can often make or break a case. Even if a claim has merit, it may ultimately be statute-barred if it is brought too late. As limitation periods begin when a claim is first ‘discoverable’, it is important to establish when the clock starts ticking to determine if a claim is indeed out of time.

In its recent decision in Harris v. Melo, 2026 ONCA 798, the Ontario Court of Appeal clarified the definition of ‘discoverability’ in disputes involving the ownership of real property.

Background

After his initial plan to purchase a property with another party fell through, the appellant asked the respondent to purchase a property with him in 1989. At the time, the parties were in a relationship. The respondent agreed to put her name on title as a tenant in common with a 50% interest and co-signed the mortgage documents. The appellant solely funded the down payment.

There is no evidence that the respondent financially contributed to the purchase, mortgage or upkeep of the property. After the parties ended their relationship in 1990, the appellant continued to solely manage the property and collect rents from tenants. The respondent remained on title, but moved to Vancouver while the appellant remained in Ontario.

The respondent commenced an application for the partition and sale of the property, an accounting of the income and expenses from September 2021 relating to the property, and 50% of the net proceeds from income. The appellant commenced a cross-application that essentially claimed that the respondent was not the ‘true owner’ of her 50% interest in the property and she was simply holding the 50% interest in favour of the appellant. The appellant claimed that the respondent was only added to title to secure mortgage financing, and sought an order that he was the sole owner of the property.

The Application

In or around 1992, the respondent hired a lawyer to have her removed from the mortgage and title on the property. The respondent also made efforts to sell her interest in the property to a third party around this time. Given the respondent’s actions, the application judge found that by at least 1995, the respondent gave the appellant notice of her position that she was both a legal and beneficial owner of the property.

The general limitation period for real property is governed by s. 4 of the Real Property Limitations Act (“RPLA”), which provides that actions to recover real property must be commenced within ten years of the “right to… bring such action first accrued to the person bringing it.” In other words, individuals have ten years from the time the claim was first discoverable to bring a claim to recover a property.

As the appellant commenced his cross-application more than ten years after 1995 (i.e., when the claim was first discoverable), the application judge found that the appellant’s cross-application was out of time. The application judge found that had his cross-application not been statute-barred (i.e., brought within the ten-year period), the appellant would have been entitled to a declaration that he was the sole owner of the property. In short, the appellant’s cross-application had merit but could not proceed due to the expiration of the limitation period.

The Appeal

The appellant claimed that s. 5(1) of the RPLA governs the start of the discoverability period in s. 4:

Where the person claiming such land or rent, or some person through whom that person claims, has, in respect of the estate or interest claimed, been in possession or in receipt of the profits of the land, or in receipt of the rent, and has, while entitled thereto, been dispossessed, or has discontinued such possession or receipt, the right to make an entry or distress or bring an action to recover the land or rent shall be deemed to have first accrued at the time of the dispossession or discontinuance of possession, or at the last time at which any such profits or rent were so received. (emphasis added)

It is undisputed that since purchasing the property, the appellant continuously received the rents and was never dispossessed of his ownership. As such, s. 5(1) applied and the limitation period did not start running because the appellant was never dispossessed nor was his possession ever discontinued. Therefore, the appellant’s claim was not statute-barred.

The appeal was allowed and the application judge’s decision was set aside. The Court of Appeal declared the appellant to be the beneficial owner of the respondent’s 50% interest in the property.

Conclusion

Even if a claim is supported by strong evidence, the expiration of the limitation period may undermine the viability of the claim. Given the importance of limitation periods, litigants should be mindful that any potential claims are brought in time.

Ruth Paul

Ruth obtained her law degree from Queen’s University. Prior to law school, she completed her Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in Political Science from Western University. During her time at Queen’s University, Ruth volunteered with Queen’s Legal Aid Clinic, Pro Bono Students Canada, and the 519 Trans ID Clinic. She also competed in the 2024 Laskin Moot Court Competition in Calgary, Alberta and won second best factum.

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