Mohapel v. Young, 2024 ONSC 1332 is a recent case which addresses the issue of will interpretation. The applicant, Iva Mohapel (“Iva”), sought an order that the respondent estate trustee, Doulgas Michael Charles Young (the “ET”), distribute the residue of the estate in four equal shares to her and each of the respondents (children of the deceased). Paragraphs 4(e) and (f) of the deceased’s November 3, 2022 last will and testament stated (the “Will”) stated:

4. I GIVE all my PROPERTY, wheresoever situate, including any property over which I may have a general power of appointment to my trustee upon the following trusts, namely:

…

(e) In the event that IVA MOHAPEL and I do not have any ownership interest either separately or jointly in a primary residence at my death then to transfer the rest and residue of my estate to IVA MOHAPEL, LAURA ELIZABETH YOUNG, CATHERINE MARGARET DAHL and DOUGLAS MICHAEL CHARLES YOUNG in equal shares.

(f) In the event that IVA MOHAPEL and I do have an ownership interest in a primary residence at my death either separately or jointly then to transfer the rest of my estate to LAURA ELIZABETHER YOUNG, CATHERINE MARGARET DAHL AND DOUGLAS MICHAEL CHARLES YOUNG in equal shares.

The court noted that the will was made in contemplation of marriage and that Iva and the deceased were not married when he died on February 4, 2023. They were financially independent and each owned and lived in separate residences in Ottawa.

Iva submitted that under paragraph 4(e) of the Will, she was entitled to a one quarter equal share of the residue of the deceased’s estate. The ET argued that under paragraph 4(f), Iva was not entitled to a share of the residue because Iva “separately” had an ownership interest in a primary residence (her own) when the deceased died.

As Justice Bell reasoned, when interpreting a will, the court’s task is to determine the testator’s actual or subjective intention as to how they intended to dispose of their property: Ross v. Canada Trust Company, 2021 ONCA 161 (“Ross”), at para. 36. In that case, Justice Brown observed that the approach to will interpretation includes studying the will’s contents and the use of what is known as the “armchair rule”. Where the court is not convinced that the testator’s intention can be discerned from the will itself, the court is to “put itself in the position of the testator at the point when [they] made [their] will, and, from that vantage point, reads the will, and construes it, in the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances”.

The court went on to explain that in this case, the deceased’s intentions could be discerned from the content of the Will itself. Justice Bell stated, “I begin with paragraph 4(f). Substituting the plural pronoun “we” for the compound subject “Iva Mohapel and I”, paragraph 4(f) reads: “In the event that [we] do have an ownership interest in a primary residence at my death either separately or jointly then to transfer the rest and residue of my estate to [the respondents] in equal shares.” On its face, paragraph 4(f) applies in the event that, at the time of Michael’s death, Iva and Michael – “we” – owned a primary residence. They did not.”

Further, the court (again following the reasoning in Ross) remarked that in considering whether the testator’s intention can be discerned from the will itself, the court is to study not only the provisions of the will in dispute, but the entire will. Indeed, Iva argued that paragraph 7 of the Will confirmed the deceased’s testamentary intentions for her to benefit from the estate. Specifically, paragraph 7 provided:

WITH RESPECT TO THE SALE OF PROPERTY and the division of property amongst the beneficiaries, it is my wish and expectation that my son, DOUGLAS MICHAEL CHARLES YOUNG, as executor will fully consult with his sisters, LAURA ELIZABETH YOUNG, CATHERINE MARGARET DAHL and IVA MOHAPEL prior to reaching decisions regarding the disposition of my assets and the timing of the disposition.

The court agreed with Iva that the instruction to the ET to consult with Iva and the other children confirmed the deceased’s intention for Iva to be a beneficiary under the Will. Otherwise, there would have been no reason to include her in paragraph 7.

The court also considered the alternative interpretative arguments made by the ET, but those were not accepted (this analysis is worth a read nonethless). Ultimately, the court found that the deceased’s intentions were clearly expressed in the Will and that the deceased wanted Iva to receive an equal share of the residue of the estate. The application was granted.

This case helps to demonstrate that while there may be varying or conflicting interpretations to testamentary documents, the court will ultimately be guided by the fundamental principles cited in this case and in Ross, in arriving at its decision.